- The inspections will go on, and the USA and Britain can only lick their
wounds. "A case for war? Yes, say US and Britain. No, say the majority
of the Security Council".
- On February 24, 2003, Saddam Hussein said that he would not destroy the
al Samoud 2 missiles as ordered by Hans Blix. He agreed that without weapon
and electronic guidance systems, the missiles have a range exceeding by about
30 km the 150 km imposed by the UN but, when fully loaded, their range remains
within what is authorised. President Bush and his gang do not accept this,
but the other countries do.
- On February 27, 2003, Saddam Hussein finally agreed to destroy his al-Samoud
2 missiles. The USA and Britain said immediately that it was an insignificant
step towards disarmament -why asks for it, then? - while France, Germany and
Russia, as well as Dr Blix, said that it was an important fact that was reinforcing
them in the belief that war was not necessary and that stronger inspections
could solve the Iraqi problem.
- Iraq destroyed 4 al-Samoud 2 missiles on March 1, and 6 on March 2 and 3,
2003. And still the USA and Britain say that it is irrelevant, and one of
Saddam Hussein's usual tricks to win some time. On March 3, Donald Rumsfeld,
that stupid dinosaur, said that destroying missiles was not a proof that Iraq
was disarming. Saddam Hussein jumped on the opportunity to say that in these
conditions, as the US will attack his country whatever he does, Iraq could
well stop the destruction of its missiles al Samoud 2.
- On March 5, 2003, we are told that Hans Blix' report due to be delivered
to the UN Security Council on March 7, 2003, will state that Iraq is still
not cooperating as it should or as Mr Blix would like (the Americans want
always something more, so let us ignore them). It is a fact that Iraq is destroying
its al-Samoud 2 missiles and is giving the inspectors written information
on how, when, and where they destroyed their chemical and biological weapons.
- The Russian Foreign Minister, in a meeting with Blair and Straw, said that
the time for war has not yet come, and more inspection work is needed. He
added that Russia will not abstain at the UN Security Council and, probably,
will veto a second resolution on the present terms.
- On March 6, 2003, the British newspapers revealed that a chemical plant
the Americans said was a key component in Iraq's chemical warfare arsenal,
was secretly built by Britain in 1985. The contract for the construction of
the £14m Falluja 2 project was approved by Mrs Thatcher's government
that backed financially the British firm Uhde Ltd, owned by a German company.
It was known that it could be used to produce mustard and nerve gas at the
time when Saddam Hussein was using these gases in his war with Iran. The plant
was completed in 1990 but British taxpayers paid £300,000 in compensation
to the German owners when the Gulf War interrupted the reception tests in
1991. Colin Powell mentioned this plant in his UN Security Council speech
in February 2003 as a reason why the world should go to war against Iraq.
The UN inspectors visited the plant in December 2002 and reported that the
equipment incriminated had been destroyed.
- The latest report of MM Blix and ElBaradei was a mixture of good and bad
news. They said that a lot of progress had been made to secure Iraq collaboration,
but they added, that Iraq is still withholding some documents. They also asked
for more time to complete their work.
- The battle to get the vote of the six non-committed small countries members
of the Security Council goes on. To improve the probabilities that the UN
Security Council would approve a new resolution authorising war, Blair is
making some concessions, and he is proposing amendment after amendment to
his project. Among other things, he is willing to describe clearly which acts
of disarmament are expected from Iraq before March 17 to avoid invasion instead
of demanding an unspecified "total disarmament". Blair would also
accept that the vote on the second resolution be delayed a few more days,
postponing also, as a consequence, the date of March 17 for Iraq's answer.
The Americans do not seem to agree on this, and still insist on a vote on
March 11 or 14, at the latest.
- On March 7, 2003, the former British Intelligence's claim that Iraq tried
to import uranium for a nuclear bomb from Niger was said to be unfounded,
and based on fabricated evidence according to the UN inspectors. The documents
presented by the British Intelligence in September 2002 are not authentic
according to Dr ElBaradei.
- On March 7 2003, on the base of the UN inspectors' report, France and Russia
hardened their opposition to war, and China was not far off. France threatened
to use its veto to stop any new resolution authorising war, directly or implicitly.
Russia did not go so far as threatening to use their veto but, with China,
they want the inspection to go on. In addition, six junior member countries
of the UN Security Council have yet to say if they will back the US/British's
resolution, or if they will join France, Germany and Russia asking for more
time.
- On April 12, 2003, the Americans are in despair to find weapons of mass
destruction. And they are free to do it the way they want now that they have
invaded Iraq. But up to now they have not found any! If not, how are they
going to justify their military intervention after sending the UN inspectors
home?
- Following the invading troops, military specialists are searching for such
weapons. But they are not real experts, so the USA and Britain created a secret
team of qualified inspectors. Charles Duelfer, a former deputy head of the
UN weapons inspectors, heads it.
- On April 11, 2003, Dr Blix, the Swedish head of the UN weapons inspectors
team, declared that he always knew that war against Iraq was a foregone conclusion.
He accused the USA and Britain of planning the war "well in advance",
and of "fabricating" evidence against Iraq to justify their campaign.
He added that the thousand of dead Iraqi and the destruction of their country
was not justified, and that the search for weapons of mass destruction and
their elimination -if any was ever found- could have been done by the UN inspectors.
- He added that President Bush misled him in their meeting at the White House
in October 2002 when Bush told him that he backed the work of the UN inspectors.
The accusation that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction was only a smoke
screen for their main objective, to remove Saddam Hussein's regime. He should
have added that getting control of the Iraqi oil and working for his own re-election
were also high up on Bush's list of priorities.
- On April 21, 2003, Russia insisted that the UN weapon inspectors should
go back to Iraq to guarantee that there are no weapons of mass destruction
before the sanctions are lifted, and before the "new Iraq" is allowed
to freely sell its oil. The British government seemed to agree and promised
that any weapons of mass destruction found in Iraq would be independently
verified.
- American republicans said that it could even take years to prepare Iraq
for democracy. This reflects their fear that immediate elections could lead
to a militant Islamic republic.
- Tony Blair is to fly to Moscow on April 29 to try to convince president
Putin to agree to lift the sanctions on Iraq although it has not yet be declared
free of weapons of mass destruction by the UN inspectors. Britain and the
USA refuse to let them in Iraq. Chirac, on the other hand, said that France
could agree to suspend the sanctions and be pragmatic about the future of
Iraq. Russia insists that it will oppose lifting the sanctions until Dr Blix's
inspectors are allowed to resume their tasks.
- On May 10, 2003, the lack of success in the search for the weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq created problems to all the US and British intelligence
services (CIA, FBI, DIA, MI5, etc). It is now becoming clear that a new special
intelligence group working directly for Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon, a
department of the Office of Special Plans (OSP) known as the Cabal, had the
ears of the Defence Secretary and of president Bush. This organisation only
took into consideration the worst possible interpretation of the information
at their disposal. This office was set up after September 11, 2001, and reports
to Paul Wolfowitz, a leading hawk in the administration.
- On May 13, 2003, the United Nations nuclear inspectors expressed their fear
that the widespread looting of Iraq's nuclear facilities at al-Tuwaitha, 15
miles south of Baghdad, may result in terrorists building radioactive "dirty
bombs". Many radioactive isotopes used in medicine, but nonetheless very
radioactive, as well as some raw uranium have been stolen.
- On May 28, 2003, Donald Duck (Rumsfeld) said that the USA would possibly
never find the weapons of mass destruction that justified the war against
Saddam Hussein. Donald added that it is possible that Saddam Hussein destroyed
them before the invasion started. However, he maintains that such weapons
were produced by Iraq before and used against his own people and Iran. But
where are they?
- On June 7, 2003, the Italian newspaper "La Republica" is saying
that the White House knew in September 2002 that Iraq had no weapons of mass
destruction. The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) in a secret report said
that they had no certain information that Saddam Hussein had any such weapons,
and the Pentagon had to admit that this information is true. Tony Blair is
accused to have sent back the "dossier" to the Intelligence Services
6 or 8 times to rewrite it in the way he wanted it. In some newspapers, Blair
is now known as Tony Bliar!!
- On June 11, 2003, Dr Hans Blix the head of the UN inspectors in Iraq, due
to leave his job at the end of this month, criticised openly the Americans
for the way they treated him and his inspectors. He went as far as saying
that Washington put some pressure on his inspectors to write their reports
to show Iraq in a negative light.
- At the beginning of June 2003 we were told that Straw, the British Foreign
Secretary, and Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, had always some doubt
on the value of the intelligence reports on the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
Even when presenting the so-called evidences to the UN Security Council and
to the world, they had doubts about the quality of these reports. If this
is true, then they behaved in a criminal way for not making their concern
public and allowing the war to take place.
- On July 13, 2003, Dr Blix, the former UN weapons chief inspector, renewed
his attack on Tony Blair saying that the assertion that Iraqi army could use
weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes of being ordered to do so was
a fundamental mistake.
- On September 17, 2003, Dr Hans Blix, the former UN chief weapons inspector,
said that he believes that Iraq destroyed most of its weapons of mass destruction
10 years ago. For him, Saddam Hussein gave the impression that he still had
these weapons to deter a military attack. He added that Washington and London
"spinned" the information available to justify the invasion.
- On January 8, 2004, Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, defended the
speech he made at the UN Security Council on February 2, 2003. Now after the
UN inspectors and, after the invasion, US and British experts combing the
country freely for more that 8 months, nothing was found. Still, Powell said
that the Iraqis possessed such arms for many years and intended to use them.
At the same time an American "Think Tank", the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, said, "the administration systematically misrepresented
the threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes".
- The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, was probably the most respected
man in the US government, more respected that Bush anyway. And this is true
not only in the USA but also in most countries over the world. However by
January 2004, even the Americans had lost faith in his moral integrity. His
persuasive misrepresentation of the threat posed by Iraq at the UN Security
Council on February 5, 2003, was well accepted all over the world. There is
only a problem: it was a lie, and he knew it was.
- In the first day of January 2004 Colin Powell made a half-hearted effort
to justify his pre-war assertions in light of the post-war realities, but
he was less convincing this time. None of the weapons of mass destruction
he told the UN were in Iraq, ready to be used have been found; the link between
Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida did not exist; the participation of Iraq in the
September 11, 2001, terrorist actions have been disproved. In other words
Colin Powell was wrong or he lied to the UN Security Council, to the USA and
to the world and he should resign.
- On February 3, 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell said that he might
not have supported the decision to go to war in Iraq if he had known that
Saddam Hussein had no weapons of mass destruction. It is the first public
crack within the Bush administration. However he still think that it was a
good thing to remove Saddam Hussein from power.
- On February 8, 2004, the former head of the UN weapons inspectors in Iraq,
Hans Blix, accused George Bush and Tony Blair of behaving like insincere salesmen
by exaggerating the intelligence available to win support for the war (as
in the famous argument about weapons of mass destruction being ready to use
within 45 minutes of an order). He added that the US and British intelligence
services were too ready to believe the "tales" of Iraqi defectors
and exiles.
- On March 5, 2004, Hans Blix the former UN chief weapons inspector criticised
Tony Blair's defence of the invasion of Iraq. He said that Blair and Bush
had been selling intelligence as "hard facts" when in fact they
were only interpretation of various information that became known as untrue
with time.
- On May 6, 2004, the deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, said Colin
Powell, was bothered by the damages to his credibility resulting from his
famous speech at the UN Security Council in which he showed so-called Saddam
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. Halan Ullman from the National War
College described the US national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, as a
"jerk".
- On July 21, 2004, Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, told reporters that Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari
had formally asked his agency to return. The inspectors will continue their
work to ensure that Iraq adheres with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
They will go back to Iraq as soon as safety arrangements have been made, perhaps
already in the next few days. They will not search for weapons of mass destruction,
but they must write the final report about the non-existence of these weapons.
- Secretary of State Colin Powell said on September 14, 2004, that when he
made the case to the United Nations for the invasion of Iraq, some US intelligence
officials knew that many of the claims about weapons and terrorist ties were
suspect, but that they had not informed him of their doubts.
- Everyone was fooled, everyone deceived everyone else, and these are the
conclusions from the CIA's chief weapons investigator for Iraq, Charles Duelfer's
report presented to the US Senate on Wednesday October 6, 2004. Duelfer's
definitive judgment is that Saddam Hussein had abandoned his chemical, biological,
and nuclear weapons programs in the early 1990s.
- Vice President Dick Cheney who previously acknowledged that Iraq had produced
no weapons of mass destruction after 1991, said Tuesday October 12, 2004,
that under Saddam Hussein the country could have served as a source of weapons
for terrorists. Everything is possible including the opposite!
- Former US secretary of state Colin Powell said in a television interview
on Friday September 9, 2005, that his UN speech making the case for the US-led
war on Iraq was "a blot" on his record. In the February 2003 presentation
he forcefully made the case for war on the regime of Saddam Hussein, offering
''proof'' that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction using satellite photos
of trucks identified as mobile bio-weapons laboratories. After the invasion
US weapons inspectors reported finding no Iraqi nuclear, biological or chemical
weapons.
- On February 12, 2006, Russia wants all findings of the international weapons
inspections in Iraq to be presented to the UN Security Council. The findings
should be combined with those of U.S.-led inspectors who combed the country
for weapons of mass destruction after Saddam Hussein's ousting in 2003. The
Iraq dossier needed to be finalized, these files cannot stay open three years
afterward the work was done, it is not good for Iraq, it is not good for anyone.
The IAEA and UNMOVIC were the two UN agencies charged with finding weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq. The IAEA led the search for nuclear weapons,
while UNMOVIC was responsible for biological and chemical weapons, as well
as rockets. The IAEA said before the war it had no proof that Baghdad had
reconstituted its nuclear program.
- In June 2007, the United States and Britain proposed a draft resolution in the Security Council that would immediately terminate the work of UN inspectors tasked with monitoring and dismantling Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. If agreed it would "terminate immediately" the mandate of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), charged with locating and dismantling Iraq's chemical and biological weapons as well as its long-range missiles. It would also shut down the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Iraq Nuclear Verification Office, responsible with dismantling the country's nuclear weapons program. Following the failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq after the end the US-led invasion in 2003, Washington has for the past two years pressed for an end to all related UN inspection work there.
- UNMOVIC was set up in 1999 under Security Council Resolution 1284 to verify that Iraq no longer had WMDs and had complied with its obligations not to acquire new proscribed arms. The UN inspectors pulled out of Iraq on March 18, 2003, immediately before the start of the US-led invasion, and were not allowed to return. The work of hunting down Iraq's suspected WMDs was then taken over by a US-led coalition body, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), but no weapons were found, seriously undermining what had been the major US and British argument for going to war. The US-British draft would urge Baghdad to continue to implement its constitutional commitment "to the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production and non-use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and associated equipment." UNMOVIC, which by the end of last month had a core staff of 34 professionals from 19 nationalities, spends roughly one million dollars a month. It succeeded the United Nations Special Commission for Iraq (UNSCOM), which itself grew out of the UN inspection process established after the 1991 Gulf war in which US-led forces booted invading Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. The US-British draft would also ask Ban "to take all necessary measures" to secure UNMOVIC" archives and in particular ensure "that sensitive proliferation information or information provided in confidence by member states is kept under strict control."
The US and Britain should be ashamed but, unfortunately, "le ridicule ne tue pas."
- On July 1, 2007, the United Nations Security Council has voted to close down the weapons inspection programme set up to monitor former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's arsenal. United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (Unmovic) was set up in 1999 to check Iraq no longer had any weapons of mass destruction. Its inspectors permanently quit Iraq just before the US invasion in 2003. Following the invasion, the task of hunting for the weapons on the ground was taken over by a US-led body, the Iraq Survey Group. Neither body found the secret arsenal of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons that the US and Britain had claimed Iraq possessed.
- High oil prices mean a windfall in revenue for Iraq's government, but the
Iraqis have failed to spend all that money properly on the country's infrastructure
we were told on August 6, 2008. The Iraq government had almost $30 billion
in unspent funds in its coffers at the end of last year.